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FACEBOOK, INC., et al.,
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Defendants.
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Hon. Richard Seeborg
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In accordance with Civil Local Rule 7.3(d)(2), Objectors John Schachter et al. call this

23

Court’s attention to the Ninth Circuit’s recent unpublished decision, In re Magsafe Apple Power

24

Adapter Litig., No. 12-15757, 2014 WL 1624493 (9th Cir. Apr. 24, 2014), which reverses and

25

vacates one of the authorities upon which class counsel relies in its motion to impose an appeal

26

bond. Compare Doc. 435, Mot. for Posting of Appeal Bond 21 (“[C]ourts routinely apply Rule

27

39 taxable costs in the tens of thousands of dollars.” (citing, among other cases, In re MagSafe
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1

Apple Power Adapter Litig., No. C 09-01911 JW, 2012 WL 2339721 (N.D. Cal. May 29,

2

2012))), with In re MagSafe, 2014 WL 1624493, at *1 (9th Cir.) (“A district court may always

3

include in an appeal bond the costs specified in Fed. R. App. P. 39. Yet these costs rarely exceed

4

a few hundred dollars when taxed against an appellant. The district court may not include in an

5

appeal bond any expenses beyond those referenced in Fed. R. App. P. 39 unless such expenses

6

may be shifted pursuant to another statute. . . . The district court abused its discretion by

7

requiring the objectors to post $15,000 appeal bonds given that the only applicable fee-shifting

8

statute is Fed. R. App. P. 39.” (citations omitted)).
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A copy of the new decision is attached.
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Dated: April 28, 2014
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In re: MAGSAFE APPLE POWER
ADAPTER LITIGATION,

No. 12-15757
D.C. No. 5:09-cv-01911-JW

NAOTAKA KITAGAWA, Jr.; et al.,
MEMORANDUM*
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
ROBERT JOSEPH GAUDET, Jr.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
V.
APPLE, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.

In re: MAGSAFE APPLE POWER
ADAPTER LITIGATION,

No. 12-15782
D.C. No. 5:09-cv-01911-JW

NAOTAKA KITAGAWA, Jr.; et al.,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
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v.
MARIE GRYPHON, Objector,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
V.
APPLE, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
James Ware, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 8, 2014
San Francisco, California
Before: SILVERMAN, W. FLETCHER, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Objector-Appellant Marie Newhouse appeals the district court’s March 8,
2012, order approving a class action settlement agreement and attorneys’ fee award
and its May 29, 2012, order requiring Newhouse and other objectors to post appeal
bonds. We vacate both orders and remand for further consideration. ObjectorAppellant Robert Gaudet, Jr. appeals the aforementioned orders as well as the

2
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district court’s August 22, 2012, order striking his objection to the settlement
agreement and attorneys’ fee award. We also vacate that order.1
I. APPEAL BOND
A.

Appeal Bond Order
“[W]e review objections to the amount of a bond for abuse of discretion.

However, the meaning of the phrase ‘costs on appeal’ [in Fed. R. App. P. 7] is a
question of law that we review de novo.” Azizian v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc.,
499 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The plaintiffs filed a motion to require each objector to post a $200,000
appeal bond, asserting that they anticipated incurring $25,000 in expenses and
$175,000 in attorneys’ fees on appeal. The district court correctly reasoned that
the bond could not secure anticipated attorneys’ fees because no statute authorizes
shifting attorneys’ fees from objector-appellants to plaintiff-appellees under these
circumstances. See id. at 959–60. The district court erred, however, in not
applying the same logic to the plaintiffs’ request for expenses.
A district court may always include in an appeal bond the costs specified in
Fed. R. App. P. 39. See id. at 955–56. Yet these costs rarely exceed a few hundred

1

The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), and we have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3
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dollars when taxed against an appellant. The district court may not include in an
appeal bond any expenses beyond those referenced in Fed. R. App. P. 39 unless
such expenses may be shifted pursuant to another statute. See id. at 959–60. The
fee-shifting statutes invoked by the plaintiffs—including 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2),
Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(e), and Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d)—are asymmetrical
because they permit fee shifting only from losing defendants to prevailing
plaintiffs. Expenses, like attorneys’ fees, cannot be shifted from losing objectors to
prevailing plaintiffs under asymmetrical statutes. See Azizian, 499 F.3d at
959–60.2
The district court abused its discretion by requiring the objectors to post
$15,000 appeal bonds given that the only applicable fee-shifting statute is Fed. R.
App. P. 39. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s May 29, 2012, order. On
remand, the district court may impose an appeal bond that more accurately reflects
the amount that a prevailing appellee would be entitled to recover from a losing
appellant under Fed. R. App. P. 39.
B.

Order Striking Gaudet’s Objection

2

Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(e) would authorize fee shifting from losing
objectors to prevailing plaintiffs if the objector’s “prosecution of the action was not
in good faith.” The district court did not find that either Newhouse or Gaudet were
proceeding in bad faith, and such a finding would have been erroneous.
4
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We also vacate the district court’s August 22, 2012, order striking Gaudet’s
objection to the settlement agreement and attorneys’ fee award. The district court
lacked the authority to remove the basis for Gaudet’s appeal as a sanction for his
failure to post the bond because “an appellant is not required to post a Rule 7 bond
to perfect [his] appeal.” Id. at 961. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
deciding to hold Gaudet in contempt for failing to comply with the appeal bond
order. Rather, the district court erred by imposing a sanction that precluded
Gaudet from appealing its judgment. On remand, the district court may exercise its
discretion to impose any appropriate sanction for violations of its orders.
C.

Dismissal of Gaudet’s Appeal
“Where an appellant has failed to pay an appeal bond, it is within our sound

discretion to dismiss the appeal.” Id. After weighing the factors set out in Azizian,
we decline to dismiss Gaudet’s appeal. We are troubled by Gaudet’s failure to
proffer any amount toward an appeal bond. See id. at 962. Gaudet did, however,
actively contest the bond by raising reasonable arguments before the district court
and filing a motion with this court to stay the district court’s order. See id.
Although he did not make himself available for an in-person deposition concerning
his ability to pay because he had moved to Ireland, Gaudet disclosed his financial
information and informed plaintiffs’ counsel that he would submit to a telephonic
5
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deposition. Gaudet’s noncompliance is far from ideal, but it does not warrant
dismissing his appeal under these circumstances because he “did not simply
‘ignore [the] order,’ but rather made legitimate efforts to reduce its amount.” Id.
(alteration in original) (internal citation omitted).
II. SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT APPROVAL AND ATTORNEYS’ FEE
AWARD
A.

Article III Standing
The objectors have Article III standing to appeal the district court’s order

approving the settlement agreement and attorneys’ fee award. This case is
distinguishable from Glasser v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 645 F.3d 1084 (9th
Cir. 2011). There, the objector appealed only the district court’s order awarding
attorneys’ fees and not its earlier order approving the settlement agreement. Id. at
1087–88. Here, the objectors appealed the district court’s order approving the
settlement agreement and objected to the terms of the agreement before the fairness
hearing. A class member has Article III standing to challenge the attorneys’ fee
award along with the settlement agreement. See Lobatz v. U.S. W. Cellular of Cal.,
Inc., 222 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2000).
B.

Review of the District Court’s Order Approving the Settlement Agreement
and Attorneys’ Fee Award

6
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“We review approval of a class action settlement for a clear abuse of
discretion.” Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Co., 563 F.3d 948, 963 (9th Cir. 2011)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “We also review for abuse of
discretion a district court’s award of fees and costs to class counsel, as well as its
method of calculation.” In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935,
940 (9th Cir. 2011).
The district court abused its discretion in approving both the settlement
agreement and attorneys’ fee award because it failed to follow the process set out
in Bluetooth. We vacate the March 8, 2012, order and remand so that the district
court can fully consider the factors affecting the fairness of class action settlement
agreements articulated in Bluetooth.
The district court’s order accepted the lodestar of $1,986,362.00 submitted
by plaintiffs’ counsel. But the court did not explain why this figure is reasonable
beyond a few boilerplate recitations about the attorneys’ skill and the risks of
proceeding with the litigation that never reference the specific facts of this case.
Under some circumstances, “counting all hours expended on the litigation—even
those reasonably spent—may produce an ‘excessive amount.’” Id. at 942. On
remand, the district court should consider whether the lodestar was calculated

7
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using reasonable hourly rates and sound billing practices and then assess the
lodestar in light of the results obtained for the class. See id.
The district court then applied a multiplier that increased the total amount of
the attorneys’ fee award to $3,000,000 without explaining why a multiplier was
necessary to adequately compensate class counsel. If the court determines on
remand that a multiplier is appropriate, it should offer an explanation of its
decision that is sufficient to “assure itself—and us—that the amount awarded was
not unreasonably excessive in light of the results achieved.” Id. at 943. We
emphasize that Apple’s advance agreement to pay class counsel up to $3,000,000
in attorneys’ fees and $100,000 in expenses “cannot relieve the district court of its
duty to assess fully the reasonableness of the fee request.” Id.
The district court also did not cross-check the attorneys’ fee award against
the percentage-of-the-recovery method. Although we have “encouraged” rather
than required courts to cross-check their calculations, the fact that the court made
no mention of the value of the settlement, let alone the percentage-of-the-recovery
method, contributes to our determination that we “lack a sufficient basis for
determining the reasonableness of the award.” Id. at 943. The district court
conducted the fairness hearing before the claims-submission period closed, leaving
us with no reliable way of estimating how many valid claims were submitted or the
8
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total amount that Apple intends to pay claimants under the refund component of
the settlement agreement. On remand, the district court may find it useful to elicit
this information so that it can compare the amount recovered by the class with the
amount claimed by class counsel. Id. at 942. The district court should also
consider the value of the injunctive relief offered by the settlement agreement.
Alternatively, the district court might conclude that the percentage-of-the-fund
method is ill suited for evaluating the reasonableness of this particular settlement
agreement if it finds that the value of the injunctive relief is unusually difficult to
quantify. See Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1029 (9th Cir. 1998). The
discretion rests with the district court; we merely require that the court scrutinize
both the settlement agreement and fee award and offer a specific explanation about
why it deems them reasonable.
We also conclude that the district court erred by not addressing the indicia of
self-dealing or implicit collusion identified in Bluetooth. See Bluetooth, 654 F.3d
at 947. The court did not assess with specificity whether class counsel received a
disproportionate share of the settlement, nor did it mention the clear-sailing
provision or the implied reversion clause. The court might find, after conducting a
proper inquiry, that the fee award requested by the plaintiffs is proportionate to the
value received by the class, that the clear-sailing provision is outweighed by other
9
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portions of the settlement agreement, and that a reversion clause is of no concern in
an uncapped claims-made settlement. Or the court might conclude that the
agreement is tainted by the possibility of self-dealing and “direct the parties back
to the negotiating table.” Id. at 950. Once again, we request only that the court
demonstrate that it was “particularly vigilant” in monitoring for self-dealing and
implicit collusion. Id. at 947.
We do not intend to direct the district court toward a particular result. On
remand, the district court “may determine the fee request is excessive but find no
further evidence that class counsel betrayed class interests for their own benefit,
and thus uphold the agreement while lowering the fee award.” Id. at 950. The
court could also approve both the fee award and the settlement agreement in their
current form after conducting the appropriate inquiry. Id. Or “it may find the fee
request excessive and conclude that class counsel therefore negotiated an
unreasonable settlement.” Id. Finally, it might deem the settlement agreement
inadequate after considering the factors set out in Churchill Village, L.L.C. v.
General Electric, 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004).
III. CONCLUSION
The district court’s judgment is REVERSED. The district court’s March 8,
2012, order approving the settlement agreement and attorneys’ fee award; its May
10
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29, 2012, order requiring the objectors to post appeal bonds; and its August 22,
2012, order striking Gaudet’s objection are VACATED. The case is REMANDED
for proceedings consistent with this memorandum.
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